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doctrine, there is nothing inherent in the nature of a charity to justify such an
application.
[I]f the gift in trust for charity is itself conditional upon a future . ..event, it
issubject ...to the same rules ...as any other estate [contingent] ...upon
a condition precedent. ... [I]f it is so remote and indefinite as to transgress the
limits of137time prescribed by the law
against perpetuities, the gift fails
ab initio.
If the Rule Against Perpetuities is to be held inapplicable to charitable trusts,
the only recognized reason should be an expressed public policy which en-

courages private charitable benefaction, not the abstract fictions which the
cy pres doctrine has imposed on the rule against remoteness.
THE EFFECT OF PERJURY ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

IN NEW YORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law governing the effect of perjury' on the competency and credibility2
of witnesses in New York has been static for seventy-five years. The fact that
a witness has made inconsistent or false statements under oath-whether
deliberately or not, and whether in the same proceeding or not-is admissible
only to affect the weight of his testimony. A change in this rule would afford
innocent parties greater protection against perjury, and would provide a more
effective deterrent to perjury than presently exists.
137. Chamberlayne v. Brockett, S Ch. 206, 211 (1372). See also Cherry v. Blott, 1 Myl.
& C. 123, 133, 40 Eng. Rep. 323, 327 (Ch. 1836).
1. In this discussion everything which is said concerning perjury applies with equal
validity to subornation of perjury-that is, procuring another to commit perjury.
2. "Competency" refers to a witness' qualification to testify, and is always determined
by the court. "Credibility" of a witness' testimony is its worthiness of belief, and it is a
question of fact except in cases where the testimony is so ridiculous that it is incredible
as a matter of law. This latter exception seems to be limited to cases where a witness
testified to a physically impossible thing. See Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292
N.Y. 241, 246, 54 N.E.2d S09, 311 (1944); In the Matter of Estate of Harriot, 145 N.Y.
540, 545, 40 N.E. 246, 243 (1395); Hudson v. Rome, W. & O.R.R., 145 N.Y. 403, 40 N.E.
8 (189S); Schweitzer v. Forbes Fireproofing Corp., S App. Div. Zd 419, 172 N.Y.S2d 511
(1st Dep't 1953); Tosto v. Marra Bros., 275 App. Div. 6S6, S6 N.Y.2d 549 (2d Dcp't),
aff'd mem., 299 N.Y. 700, 37 N.E.2d 74 (1949); Walker v. Murray, 255 App. Div. 315,
7 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1933), aff'd mem., 230 N.Y. 7G9, 21 N.E.2d 20 (1939);
Lindenbaum v. Georgakakos, 27 Misc. 2d 979, 214 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Royce
Haulage Corp. v. Bronx Terminal Garage Inc., ISS Misc. S92, 57 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct.
1945); Smith v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 911, 229 N.Y.S.2d 43S (CL CI. 1962).
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HISTORICALLY: EFFECT OF PRIOR CONVICTION OF CRIME ON
COMPETENCY AND CREDIBILITY

A. Crime in General
The common-law rule in New York, a carry-over from English law, disqualified any person from testifying who had been convicted of an infamous
crime. 3 The dubious reasoning supporting this rule was that a person guilty of
such a crime was 4not to be trusted in any regard, and therefore should not be
allowed to testify.
This rule was refined and enacted into statute in New York in 1827:
No person sentenced upon a conviction for felony shall be competent to testify in
any cause, matter or proceeding, civil or criminal, unless he be pardoned by the
governor or by the legislature; except in the cases specially provided by law; but
no sentence upon a conviction for any offence other than a felony, shall disqualify
or render any person incompetent to be sworn or to testify, in any cause, matter or
proceeding, civil or criminal. 5
The objections to such a statute were many. If it be taken literally, a felon,
once sentenced, could not thereafter testify in his own defense, unless pardoned.
The fact that a person has committed a crime should cast no reflection on his
truthfulness, unless, of course, the crime involves perjury. The statute also
imposed an unjust burden upon innocent third parties-as in cases where an
erstwhile felon was the only eyewitness to an accident or crime; the disqualification of the witness might then have been the material element which unjustly
prevented recovery (a burden upon the injured party) or a conviction (a
burden upon society).
Some change, therefore, was inevitable. In 1869, by statute, all defendants
in criminal prosecutions were rendered competent to testify.0 The major step,
however, was taken in 1876, with the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure.7 Section 832, the model for our present statute, provided:
A person, who has been convicted of a crime or misdemeanor is, notwithstanding, a
competent witness [in a civil or criminal action or special proceeding]: but the
conviction may be proved, for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony,
either by the record, or by his cross-examination, upon which he must answer any
3. People v. McGloin, 91 N.Y. 241, 250 (1883); People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 707, 708
(N.Y. Ct. of Oyer & Terminer 1827).
4.

See Richardson, Evidence § 411 (8th ed. 1955); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 519 (3d ed.

1940).

5.

2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. IV, ch. 1, it. 7, § 23 (1829).

6. "In the trial of all indictments . . . against persons charged with the commission
of crimes ... the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed
a competent witness; but the neglect or refusal of any such person to testify shall not
create any presumption against him." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1869, ch. 678, § 1.
7. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1876, chs. 448-49. The Code of Civil Procedure was originally
entitled "The Code of Remedial Justice."
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question, relevant to that inquiry; and the party cross-examining him is not concluded, by his answer to such a question.8

This provision effectively repealed the old common-law rule and the earlier
enactments based on that ruleY
A similar provision was incorporated into the Penal Code in 1881.10 The
law established by these statutes still survives today, virtually unchanged, in
the Civil Practice Act" and the Penal Law,' 2 and will be continued in effect
in the Civil Practice Law and Rules.13
The only other related statute is Section 343-a of the Civil Practice Act,
which allows the introduction, for purposes of impeaching a witness, of proof
of prior inconsistent statements, either written and subscribed by him or made
under oath. This statute clearly does not apply to false statements made in the
same trial, for they are already in the record and need not be proved. It
further appears from the language of the statute that its purpose was merely
to insure that evidence of prior inconsistent statements, admitted on the
question of a witness' truthfulness, meets a minimum standard. Whether the
proof be used to render a witness' testimony incredible as a matter of law or
to impeach his credibility in the minds of the jury seems outside the purview
of this statute.
B. Perjury in Particular
At common law (before 1827) it was unnecessary to consider separately the
effect of conviction of perjury. One convicted of that crime was disqualified
because it was an infamous crime, and the fact that it was directly related
to the sacredness of the oath w-as extraneous.
The relationship between credibility and the specific crime of perjury was
recognized by the legislature for the first and only time in 1827. Since perjury
was a felony, the statute disqualifying felons would have been sufficient to
disqualify convicted perjurers. Nevertheless, the Revised Statutes also included
a provision with the definition of perjury, that one convicted of perjury
"shall not thereafter be received as a witness to be sworn, in14 any matter or
cause whatever, until the judgment against him be reversed."'
This statute was not a holdover from the common-law theory that one
guilty of an infamous crime is not to be trusted. Rather, the rationale was
that one convicted of perjury has been proved, beyond a reasonable doubt,
to have a flagrant disregard for the sacredness of the oath-and therefore his
testimony thereafter became entirely untrustworthy.
3. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1876, ch. 448, § 832. The bracketed words were added by amendment, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1S79, ch. 542.
9. People v. McGloin, 91 N.Y. 241, 251 (1333).
10. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 676, § 714.
11. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 350.
12. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2444.
13. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules §§ 4513-14.
14. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 4, § 1 (1829).
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This reasoning, however, was based on the theory that a person who has
lied once will probably lie again. Stated so generally, the theory is clearly
unsound. There may be present an overpowering motive to prevaricate in one
situation which is absent in any other. Further, the theory runs contrary to
the supposed remedial character of imprisonment for crime. In addition, a
permanent punishment was thereby imposed which could, as a practical
matter, deprive the perjurer of many of his civil remedies, 1 and render him
vulnerable to unjust prosecution for crimes he did not commit. 10 Innocent
third parties could also be injured, in cases where proof of a legitimate cause
of action or defense depended on the testimony of the one-time perjurer.
Most probably it was these considerations which occasioned the repeal of
the disqualification part of the 1827 perjury statute. The repeal was not express, but was effected indirectly 17 by the enactment of the general competency
statutes, quoted above,' which did not segregate perjury from the class of
crimes which no longer disqualified a witness. Although a perjury conviction
no longer had any effect on his competency, it was nevertheless admissible, on
a par with any other criminal conviction, to affect the "weight of his testimony"
-presumably as a protection for the court and for third parties against
further false swearing. Since that time, it has been the jury's task to determine
the bearing of previous crime on the issue of a witness' truthfulness. Presumably the jury would consider the special nature of the crime of perjury
in making its evaluations.
Virtually every jurisdiction has enacted a statute eliminating the commonlaw disqualifications for crime. 1920A few retain the rule for perjury, and others
apply it only to criminal trials.

III.

HISTORICALLY: THE EFFECT or DELIBERATELY INCONSISTENT OR
WILFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY ON COMPETENCY AND CREDIBILITY

If a witness gives testimony materially different from that given in a prior
proceeding on the same matter, there is clearly false testimony 2 ' in at least one
instance. If this is shown to be deliberate, or if there is an admission that the
prior testimony was perjured, that circumstance is equivalent, for present purposes, to an admission of wilfully false testimony upon the same trial. There
15. A plaintiff is usually the chief witness in his own behalf. If he were rendered Incompetent to testify, he would often be unable to adduce enough other proof to sustain his
cause of action.
16. In many cases, one on trial for a crime would have difficulty defending himself
against the charge if he could not testify.
17. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 8 & 10 supra and accompanying text.
19. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
20. Id. at § 524.
21. In this discussion it is assumed that any false testimony referred to is materially
false.
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is a common factor in these situations of demonstrated perjury on the facts
in issue. The question then arises whether that witness should thereby be
rendered incredible as a matter of law, and his testimony removed from the
consideration of the jury.
At common law a witness was entirely discredited, as a matter of law, if it
was proved that he had deliberately testified falsely as to a material fact.2The rationale was that the witness was thus shown to have both a motive for
lying and a present willingness to lie in the matter at issue, and that therefore
his testimony in that matter was completely unreliable. The maxim, falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus, would properly be applied in this situation.p
The problem was first squarely presented to the New York Supreme Court
2-4
in 1825, in Dnlop v. Patterson.
There, the plaintiff's verdict was obtained
on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, who at the trial had plainly
contradicted his testimony given in a prior proceeding on the same matter.
In reversing the judgment on the verdict and holding that such testimony
should have been totally disregarded, the court stated:
No reason whatever is assigned for this prevarication, and disregard to truth. He was
not, therefore, a credible witness, unless supported as to the material fact v.hich he
attempted to establish ....
The Court ought to have charged the jury ... that the
unsupported testimony of a single witness, who swore at one time in direct contradiction to the testimony given by him at another, in relation
to the same transaction,
2
was not entitled to credit, and ought not to be regarded. 3
In 1864, however, in Dunn v. People,20 the New York Court of Appeals
ruled to the contrary. There, the defendant had been convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a sole witness who had admitted that she had committed perjury in a prior proceeding involving the same facts.- In upholding
the conviction, the court ruled that the witness' testimony must remain in the
case for the consideration of the jury, under instructions that her testimony
iniglt (not "must") be disregarded. -s Chief Judge Denio stated:
The court could not go further, without usurping the domain of the jury; for to
22. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 129 (1822) (see note 47 infra and
accompanying tet); Dunlop v. Patterson, 5 Cow. 243 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1825); Silva v. Low,
1 Johns. Cas. 1S4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799). See also 3 Wigmore, Evidence § NO59 (3d ed. 1940).
23. The Santissima Trinidad, supra note 22.
24. 5 Cow. 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1325).
25.

Id. at 247-48. (Emphasis added.)

26. 29 N.Y. 523 (lS64).

27. In a prosecution for advising the use of a medicine with intent to caut2 a miscarriage, the defendant vas convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the mother, who
admitted having perjured herself in a prior proceeding againt the defendant for support
of the illegitimate child.
28.

29 N.Y. at 530.
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them the law has entrusted the right of determining upon the credibility of witnesses.2
held merely that the charge to the jury
Dunlop was distinguished as having
30
had not been sufficiently cautious.
Both Dunlop and Dunn were decided before the statutes disqualifying a
witness for conviction of crime were repealed. 31 In Deering v. MetcaJ, 1' the
first case thereafter in which the same issue arose, it was contended by the
appellant that the respondent's sole witness was, as a matter of law, not entitled
to belief, because he had testified falsely at the trial and, therefore, there was
no evidence to support the verdict. The court of appeals sidestepped the question by deciding that the testimony had not been shown to have been
deliberately false. It is noteworthy that Dunn was not considered the law. In
fact, the language used by the court indicated that it deemed still unsettled
just what effect perjury at the trial would have on the credibility of the
witness in law.33
Ten years later, the landmark case, People v. O'Neil3 4 was decided. The
trial court,35 in a prosecution for bribery, refused to charge that if the jury found
that any of the people's witnesses had committed perjury in a Senate subcommittee hearing on the same matter, they must wholly disregard the testimony of these witnesses. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, adopting
the Dunn rule 36 as the correct one under the new statutory provisions on
competency. Judge Andrews stated the court's reasoning as follows:
[T]he section [N.Y. Penal Code § 714] expressly makes a person convicted of
crime, not excepting perjury, a competent witness in any cause or proceeding, civil
or criminal. .

.

.It would be manifestly absurd, in the light of this statute, now to

hold that an unconvicted perjurer was an incompetent witness whose evidence could
not be considered by the jury, when, under the statute, if he had been convicted,
his evidence must be received and weighed by the jury. In view of the present
statute, whatever doubts may have heretofore existed, the true rule is that stated
by Judge Denio in Dunn v. People (29 N.Y. 529), and which was followed on the
trial of this case, that the testimony of a witness who has committed perjury in the
same matter on a prior occasion, whether the perjury is established by a conviction
or by his confession, or is found by the jury, "must be considered by the jury
29.

Ibid.

30.

Id. at 528-29.

31.

See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.

32.

74 N.Y. 501 (1878).

33. "Now we are not called upon in the case in hand to say what is, or should be the
rule in the case of a witness, of whom it is apparent that he had sworn corruptly false."
Id. at 506. "How it would be in a case where it was, to our judgment, conclusively shown
that the witness was corruptly false, we are not now called upon to say." Id. at 507.
34.

109 N.Y. 251, 16 N.E. 68 (1888).

35. 48 Hun 36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888).
36.

See note 26 supra.
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in connection with the other evidence, under such prudential instructions as may
be given by the court, and subject to the determination of the court having a juris" 37
diction to grant new trials in cases of verdicts against evidence.
Two years later, in People v. Chapleau,3 8 the court of appeals again discussed
at length the bearing of perjury upon competency and credibility. Judge Gray
stated:
[T]he weight of authority was ... that the question of the credibility of a witness
was one for the jury, and that the only exception to the rule was in cases where
the discrepancies in the testimony were the result of deliberate falsehood. (The
Santissimza Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 339 .... ) But, since the enactment of section 714
of the Penal Code and section 832 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we must hold
that a new rule obtains, and that the rule and policy of the law are to allow all
testimony to go to and be weighed by the jur,.39

IV7. CmRxsIS
A. The Present Rule
There is under the present law virtually no deterrent to a would-be perjurer.
The difficulty and consequent infrequency of perjury prosecutions makes the
criminal sanction of dubious effect. Trial judges hesitate to overturn a verdict
when the only issue is the credibility of a witness, and appellate courts likewise give the jury almost absolute discretion in deciding what parts of the
testimony are true. While we may not assume that every witness is two-faced,
neither may we close our eyes to abuses that do exist. ° There is dearly a
need for a more effective deterrent to perjury. It is submitted that a slight
extension of the present credibility rules would meet this need, and that it is
within the power of the courts to make the change.
The present rule on credibility of perjurers is not statutory; rather, it was
laid down in dictum of the court of appeals 41 in the course of a discussion of
inapplicable statutes. It is essential here to distinguish credibility from competency. The statutes4 2' which made criminals competent were intended merely
to qualify criminals to testify, and to allow introduction of proof of a felony
conviction to affect the weight of the testimony. It is dear, then, that all
37.

109 N.Y. at 266-67, 16 N.E. at 71.

38. 121 N.Y. 266, 24 N.E. 469 (1890).
39. Id. at 276, 24 N.E. at 472. (Emphasis added.)
40. See cases cited in note 2 supra. As recently as December 1962, in Ley v. Reilly,
1 App. Div. 2d 632, 234 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1st Dep't 1962) (per curiam), it appeared that
in a trial arising out of an automobile accident, the defendant gave incredible testimony
regarding the happening of the accident, and the plaintiff gave equally incredible testimony
concerning his injuries. Such situations rarely appear in the reports unlezs the case is
appealed on another ground besides credibility. In the cited case, the appeal was on the
ground of interference by the trial court with the examination of witnesses.
41. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
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criminals were rendered competent to testify. However, these statutes did not
purport to remove or even to limit the court's power to determine, in a proper
instance, the credibility of a witness as a matter of law. Naturally the court
could not thereafter circumvent the law by deciding that all convicted felons
were incredible; but it is submitted that without violating the statutes, the
court could still decide that a witness who perjured himself on the facts in
issue was incredible as a matter of law-not because perjury is a crime, but
because such perjury is an act which evinces conscious disregard for the
sanctity of the oath under the very circumstances of the particular case.
Thus, by operation of the statutes, proof of a felony conviction as such could
at most affect the weight of the witness' testimony; but proof that a witness
had demonstrated contempt for the truth in the same or identical circumstances
could affect the witness' credibility in law. The fact that perjury is a crime
should not obscure the special nature of the act. As a crime, perjury has a
very limited effect because of the competency statutes; but due to the nature
of the act, perjury could properly be given a much greater effect.
In the light of this reasoning let us examine the O'Neil and Chapleau decisions. In O'Neil, the court of appeals really held only that a person convicted
of perjury was not thereby rendered incompetent to testify. Judge Andrews
stated: "It would be manifestly absurd . . . to hold that an unconvicted

perjurer was an incompetent witness. . . ,,43 True, it was further indicated that
"under the statute, if he [the perjurer] had been convicted, his evidence must
be received and weighed by the jury. '44 It is submitted, however, that judge
Andrews was concerned merely with competency as affected by crime-not
with credibility and the court's power to determine credibility.
The Chapleau case did not even involve the question of perjury. There
the court found that the witnesses who had testified falsely had done so not
deliberately, but rather out of fear and ignorance. Therefore, the court's statements concerning the changed effect of perjury upon credibility (which, incidentally, was attributed solely to the statutes in question, although the statutes
affected competency only) were obiter dicta. It is true that the court stated
that "the rule and policy of the law are to allow all testimony to go to and
be weighed by the jury." 45 However, this rule had not been observed as law; 40
but even assuming, arguendo, that it were the law where perjury is concerned,
it is court-made law and, therefore, may be overruled.
B. Proposed Revisions

Where wilfully and materially false testimony has been proved, by admission,
or by self-contradiction as to facts about which the witness could not have
been mistaken, or by clear and unchallenged evidence-either on trial or in
43.

109 N.Y. at 266, 16 N.E. at 71. (Emphasis added.)

44.

Ibid.

45.

121 N.Y. at 276, 24 N.E. at 472 (dictum).

46.

See note 2 supra.
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a former proceeding on the same matter-the witness should thereby be
rendered incredible as a matter of law, and his testimony should be entirely
removed from the consideration of the jury.
Furthermore, where wilfully false testimony is alleged, the jury should be
instructed that if they find that a witness has wilfully falsified his testimony
on a material fact, they vizut disregard his testimony entirely.
The reasoning which would justify such rules was well stated by the United
States Supreme Court in 1822, in The Santissima Trinidad:
But where the party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed
liable to mistake ... if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt
him from the charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such
circumstances, are bound, upon principles of law, and morality and justice, to apply
the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. What ground of judicial belief can
there be left, when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference
7
between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood'
Such a determination by the court that a witness is incredible as a matter
of law would no more be a usurpation of the jury's function than is the court's
concededly valid determination, in the proper cases, that part of a vitness'
testimony is incredible.48 The effect in each instance is the same-to remove
testimony from the jury's deliberations. Whether part or all of the testimony
is so removed is immaterial to the basic question of whether the court is
infringing upon the domain of the jury.
It is important to note that the proposed rules would take credibility from
the jury only where the witness was clearly shown to be totally unworthy
of belief on the particular matters at issue. The penalty is not too drastic, and
would only be imposed in the clearest cases. The procedure would be the same
as in any case where an issue is decided as a matter of law, and may be justified
in the usual way. The purpose is to save the time of the court and all the
parties, and to avoid the remote, but real, possibility of an emotional verdict.
While perjury can never be totally eliminated, the proposed rule should serve
to minimize it. For instance, in negligence cases arising from an automobile
accident, a passenger would be less likely to testify falsely to assist his host
if he knew that later, in his own suit against his insured host, he would he
rendered incredible as a matter of law if he testified to a new version of the
facts favorable to himself. A plaintiff testifying in a negligence action would
be deterred from magnifying his damages too greatly, knowing that if the
jury found that he perjured himself, his entire testimony in the case would
have to be disregarded and his cause of action might very well fail. In both
civil and criminal cases, defendants would be better protected against adverse
verdicts based on one witness' testimony, since the appellate courts could
reverse where perjury was evident in even one material aspect.
47. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 129, 153-54 (1S22).
48. See note 2 supra.

(Emphasis added.)
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CONCLUSION

When the subject of perjury in relation to credibility is examined in the
context of its historical development, it is apparent that the present-day rule
was merely a collateral outgrowth of the repeal of the old crime disqualification,
and has no proper foundation of its own, either in law or in logic. What is
sorely needed is positive legislation establishing a definite public policy and
a coherent set of specific rules governing credibility of witnesses, and imposing
severe civil penalties for perjury.

